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1. Introduction 
 
Jon Mandle and Janna Thompson have provided stimulating commentary on 
the work begun in Global Justice.1  I am grateful for their reflective and 
considered challenges, and the opportunity to respond to these here.  In this 
article I try to address some of  the major challenges raised by each author.  
There are a few common lines of  criticisms and in the space allocated I focus 
on those.  In the first section I address concerns related to my normative 
thought experiment.  The second section clarifies my view about what we 
owe one another and the role of  equality in the account.  The third section 
aims to explain the role of  some of  my examples in illustrating the nature of  
feasibility in global justice matters.  The fourth section grapples with the 
common problem they identify concerning the observation that the global 
justice problems that face us are ones of  collective failure of  will rather than 
lack of  vision. 
 
 
2. The normative thought experiment revisited 
 
Janna Thompson expresses some doubts about the way I use the experiments 
of  Frohlich and Oppenheimer.  She wonders what the thought experiments 
show exactly.  She also indicates that appealing to Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer’s experiments cannot be a decisive reason for favouring the 
result I do.  For one thing, maybe participants in the thought experiments 
would choose a more demanding conception of  global justice, something that 
approaches a more robustly egalitarian conception of  what we owe one 
another.  She notes, however, that the thought experiments have at least one 
important function and that is “it forces people to think as cosmopolitans 
                                                 
1 Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
GILLIAN BROCK 
 
309 
 
and thus recognises that satisfying basic needs of  the world’s people is a 
priority”2 rather than something to be deferred until they have ensured a 
high standard of  welfare for themselves.  As she correctly notes, much of  my 
discussion is aimed at showing how existing institutions can become more 
accountable to the world’s people, more just and more effective at securing 
justice.  She says: “What is needed, it seems to me, is more attention to 
developments that might encourage people to think more like the delegates in 
her thought experiment.  Is the development of  a global ‘civil society’ likely 
to have this result?  And if  so, how?  Can the internet make a contribution, or 
the growth of  non-governmental organizations?  Or do we need a democratic 
politics that transcends national borders?”3   
Like Thompson and several other critics, Mandle is also doubtful that the 
empirical work of  Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer should carry much 
weight against the Difference Principle.  The fact that subjects in an 
experiment choose a principle of  justice different from the one Rawls 
suggests they would is, he concedes, some evidence of  the choice people 
consider to be rational, however it is not decisive.  Mandle also notes that the 
participants in the experiment seem to have a mistaken view of  how 
entitlements and incentives operate in the context of  discussion over whether 
to choose the Difference Principle or some other principle when asked to 
choose the principles of  justice to operate in their societies. 
I agree that it is only against an institutional background that individuals 
come to have determinate entitlements.  The Difference Principle does not 
conflict with entitlements; rather it serves to inform what the entitlements in 
a society should be, so it is a fundamental confusion to suggests that there is 
some kind of  conflict between entitlements and the Difference Principle.  I 
agree with Mandle about all of  this.  The purpose of  raising the issue of  the 
sorts of  considerations that came up in the discussions is to show that the 
kind of  reasoning deployed is very different from the kind Rawls uses.  
Instead of  discourse about what it might be most rational to choose, the 
participants rather demonstrate that they recognise the salience of  several 
competing considerations: needs, entitlements, and incentives. They consider 
several factors to be salient and grapple with how to balance these when 
considering the principles of  just distribution that should operate in that 
society.  Making things best for the worst off  does not feature as an 
important consideration.  Rather, balancing multiple considerations takes 
centre stage.  An appreciation of  what kinds of  burdens this might place on 
those who might be funding the allocations is also thought to be relevant.  I 
raise these issues as they demonstrate a striking departure from the reasoning 
                                                 
2 Janna Thompson “On Brock’s Account of  Global Justice” in this volume, p. 295. 
3 Janna Thompson “On Brock’s Account of  Global Justice” in this volume, p. 296. 
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offered by Rawls and dominant figures in the literature, and in matching 
many people’s ways of  thinking about justice matters, seem to contain some 
insight that deserves attention.  I find the considerations that come up in 
these discussions compelling, and the fact that they match ordinary people’s 
ways of  thinking through what justice requires should not be dismissed.  
After all, the principles will need to be publicly justified so this 
correspondence could be something of  an advantage in that process.  Also, I 
believe that the experiments yield an important conclusion that has relevance 
for both the domestic and the international context.  What we owe our 
compatriots and non-compatriots is substantially the same, though the ways 
in which we might discharge the duties or distribute the responsibilities for 
satisfying the duties might be different.  
Next I try to explain further what is relevant about the experiments in 
which real people’s views are tested. I also explain why these are not 
straightforwardly empirical results that are being appealed to.  Rather, they 
are experimental results derived from modelling the impartial situation of  
the original position.  They aim to test the accuracy of  Rawls’ predictions.  
So that, coupled with the fact that Rawls viewed the experiments as a good 
test of  his theory gives them substantial normative weight.  
Which rules would we choose to govern the basic structure as rational 
people in the original position? The original position is designed to produce a 
fair agreement among free and equally situated individuals when bargaining 
advantages and disadvantages which would distort deliberation are removed.  
What connection, if  any, is or should there be between the arguments made 
for what it is rational to choose in the original position and empirical 
evidence derived from experiments conducted by Norman Frohlich and Joe 
Oppenheimer that aim to model the original position (which yield numerous 
interesting results, such as that the Difference Principle is chosen in only 1 
percent of  cases, whereas the most popular choice is a mixed principle that 
guarantees a social minimum, which is endorsed in almost 80 percent of  
cases)?4  Mandle suggests that there is no connection.  Empirical evidence 
cannot undermine normative arguments for what one ought rationally to 
choose in the original position. Broadly speaking, there are two possible ways 
to interpret the results.  First, if  people do not choose as we reason they 
should, then it might show defects with their reasoning, that people do not 
reason rationally.  Alternatively and second, it might cast doubt on our 
account of  what it is rational to choose, perhaps prompting us to re-evaluate 
whether what we assumed to be rational was really straightforwardly so.  For 
instance, it might reveal some feature that we have overlooked in considering 
what we take to be rational or it might expose alternative ways in which we 
can choose rationally – perhaps there is more than one rational choice.  I am 
                                                 
4 These experiments are discussed more fully in Global Justice, Chapter 3. 
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suggesting that we might learn something of  the second kind – it might teach 
us something about the nature of  rationality.  In particular, when 
deliberating, the delegates are balancing several important considerations 
and, mindful of  the force of  competing considerations, they are not looking 
to maximize or minimize any one of  these.  Rather they are looking to 
balance many salient considerations and, if  anything, are using a strategy 
involving optimization. This brings a useful insight to discussions overly 
dominated by “maximin” as the decision-making strategy.5 
There are many other ways in which the experiments might be revealing.  
Rawls’s normative theory has to be consistent with human nature (as Rawls 
himself recognizes and stresses).  Of course, that is no uncontroversial matter.  
However, performing the experiments in a variety of cultures (some socialist, 
some capitalist, for instance) suggests that there might be something cross-
culturally robust about the findings that can give us some insights about 
pervasive features of how we are constituted.  It is no good if Rawls gives us 
a theory for saints if human beings, as actually constituted, could never 
realize the utopia presented.  So I do not think that these experiments are 
irrelevant.  They give us some important insights about what is a realistic 
utopia for beings like us, which is Rawls’s expressed goal as well. 
There is yet another important way in which the experiments can be 
thought useful. For Rawls, justification is always second-personal; it is 
necessarily justification to someone.6 If  others do not accept the premises of  
the justification there is no justification.  Justification must be made to 
someone.  We have data to suggest that when people understand the 
Difference Principle and the case for it, they choose it in only 1% of  cases.  
Does that not suggest that the justification for the Difference Principle at 
least needs some revamping given that, when the case is made to people, they 
reject it so resoundingly?  
There are numerous ways to phrase our central question for consideration 
in the original position.  Here are two:  (i) What principles of justice might we 
agree to if we are ideally rational, in ideal conditions that model a fair 
bargaining situation?  (ii) What principles of justice might we agree to given 
the way we are now constituted – our human nature, as a short hand – which 
includes multiple and complex motivations, in ideal conditions that model a 
fair bargaining situation?  Arguably, the second question can provide the 
most compelling answer to why one should feel the normative force of any of 
the agreements made.  After all, why should I care about what an ideally 
rational creature might choose?  I am quite a long way from being that 
                                                 
5 Participants in fact show that compromise is a dominant feature of  the discussion.  
Individual’s first preference and the eventual group preference endorsed is often quite 
different. 
6 Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Belknap: Harvard University Press, 1971), 506-514. 
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creature.  Rather, I am a flawed and imperfect human being.  A case can be 
made that this second question helps provide the most persuasive answer to 
someone who wonders about why one ought to translate the insights of ideal 
theory on global justice into prescriptions for what one ought to do here and 
now to bring about more global justice. Indeed, there are some important 
precedents for appreciating the value in asking this second kind of question.7  
Arguably, this is the question I need most to answer in providing compelling 
replies to the feasibility and pro-nationalist skeptics, who are a central focus 
of my attention in the book. 
Rawls knew about Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s experiments and saw some 
preliminary results.  In personal communication, including at workshops 
where the experiments were discussed, Rawls said that the simulation was 
very useful and interesting, and the results “are indeed challenging and 
instructive”.  Rawls believed the work was crucial and that “as we 
empirically approach the ideal of a veil of ignorance, there should be 
convergence with the theoretical argument as to what would happen behind 
the veil.  This assumption of ‘continuity’ was morally relevant and needed for 
any theory of justice to have political meaning”.8  Rawls believed that the 
kinds of results being produced “would force him (and justice theorists) very 
seriously to reconsider the distributive justice part of his theory.  Indeed, he 
thought he may have to reformulate the theory”.9  Norm Frohlich also 
recalls Rawls saying that it may mean that the Difference Principle “cuts 
across the grain of human nature”.10 
Indeed, in Rawls’s later works, we notice that he is much more tentative 
about the status of the Difference Principle and he often presents it as only 
one suggestion of what might be agreed to among other possible options.11 
Also, it is quite clear that in Justice as Fairness Rawls considers the option 
that the experiments reveal people in fact choose around 80% of the time, to 
be the strongest rival to the Difference Principle. There is therefore 
important evidence that Rawls took quite seriously the possibility that 
principles similar to the ones I endorse are not implausible interpretations of 
what equally situated parties might select as principles of global justice. 
 
                                                 
7 James Fishkin’s extensive program of  conducting Deliberative Polls is one example.  See, 
for instance, James Fishkin The Voice of  the People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997); James Fishkin and Peter Laslett “Introduction” Journal of  Political Philosophy 10 
(2002): 125-128; Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin “Deliberation Day” in Journal of  
Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 129-152. 
8 Joe Oppenheimer, personal communication. 
9 Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich, personal communication. 
10 Norman Frohlich, personal communication. 
11 See for instance John Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2001), p. 49. 
GILLIAN BROCK 
 
313 
 
 
3. The content of  what we owe one another and scope for concern with inequality 
 
Let us turn next to examine more closely my account of  what we owe one 
another at both state and global level.  There is considerable space for 
concern with inequality on my account of  Global Justice and in this section I 
elaborate on this theme so we can appreciate when equality matters.  I agree 
that on the usual conception of  what our basic needs are, simply meeting this 
bare minimum standard, as it is usually understood, would be inadequate for 
an account of  global justice.  But my account endorses a much higher 
threshold of  what is required for a decent life than this standard 
interpretation. 
In Global Justice I develop a cosmopolitan model of  global justice that 
takes seriously the equal moral worth of  persons, yet leaves scope for 
defensible forms of  nationalism along with other legitimate identifications 
and affiliations.  What can we reasonably expect of  one another in the 
domain of  justice?  An alternative Rawlsian-style normative thought 
experiment offers a systematic and vivid way for thinking through such 
issues (though the arguments stand alone as well).12  The main issue delegates 
to a hypothetical conference must entertain concerns what basic framework 
governing the world’s inhabitants we can reasonably expect to agree on as 
fair.13  After considerable argument about what that entails, I endorse the 
following position:  Global justice requires that all are adequately positioned 
to enjoy prospects for a decent life, which requires we attend especially to 
                                                 
12 In arguing for what we are all owed as human beings, I argue for what our reasonable 
expectations of  one another should be, especially in situations of  ongoing cooperation. 
The set-up of  a normative thought experiment simply aims to make this more vivid to us, 
but the basic idea can be argued for independently of  that framework. When properly set 
up, such thought experiments are a good way to flesh out what we can reasonably expect 
of  one another in a way that avoids inappropriate partiality: if  people do not know what 
positions they might find themselves in during the lottery of  life, they will pay more 
attention to what would constitute fair arrangements. 
13 I will not be able to cover the details of  the normative thought experiment here, but I 
can give a brief  sketch of  some of  the main moves.  An easy way to enter the thought 
experiment is to imagine that a global conference has been organized. You have been 
randomly selected to be a decision-making delegate to this conference. You are to 
participate in deciding what would be a fair framework for interactions and relations 
among the world's inhabitants. Though you have been invited to the decision-making 
forum, you do not know anything about what allegiances you have (or may have after the 
conference concludes), but you do know that decisions made at this conference will be 
binding. It may turn out that you belong to a developing nation, occupy a territory with 
poor natural resources, and so forth. Given these sorts of  possibilities, you are provided 
with reasons to care about what you would be prepared to tolerate in a range of  different 
circumstances. 
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enabling need satisfaction, protecting basic freedom, ensuring fair terms of  
cooperation in collective endeavours, and social and political arrangements 
that can underwrite these important goods are in place.  
All four of these components constitute the basis for grounding claims of 
entitlement.  The detail of which claims they ground is begun by considering 
five domains in which our entitlements can be specified in more particular 
terms, concerning global poverty, taxation, liberty protections, humanitarian 
intervention, immigration, and the global economic order. There is no easy or 
straightforward way to move from the four categories that describe the 
contours of a decent life to obligations to secure these for others.  Moving 
from items on the list of what is needed to secure a decent life to obligations 
requires some significant discussion of empirical theories dealing with causes, 
contributory factors, and obstacles to the realisation of goals listed.  It also 
requires discussion of mechanisms available for protecting the goods 
enumerated, for enforcing obligations, and the like.  Sometimes appropriate 
mechanisms to secure elements may not be straightforward or obvious, as is 
the case when we consider the role freedom of the press has in securing 
adequate protection for basic liberties.  Similarly, when we consider our 
taxation and accounting regimes we see much scope for reforms that would 
better protect and secure countries’ abilities to assist their citizens in meeting 
basic needs. 
How does equality matter in my account of  global justice?  In virtue of  
the four central components, equality can matter in significant ways.  Recall 
that global justice requires that all are adequately positioned to enjoy 
prospects for a decent life, which entails that we attend especially to (i) 
enabling need satisfaction, (ii) protecting basic freedom, (iii) ensuring fair 
terms of  cooperation in collective endeavours, and (iv) social and political 
arrangements that can underwrite the important goods outlined in (i) - (iii).  
The four central components of  the basic account of  global justice can all 
have implications for equality.  Consider, for instance, that one of  our basic 
needs is for autonomy, which means we must be vigilant for ways in which 
autonomy can be undermined by conditions conducive to domination.  When 
inequality gives rise to such opportunities, such situations become a matter 
of  normative concern.  It is also important to emphasize that the 
commitment to fair terms of  cooperation in collective endeavours will often 
entail a concern for equality.  In addition to the basic account, I endorse a 
number of  other views that have a bearing on how demanding this account 
is, and also how equality matters in it.  For instance, I am also committed to 
an ideal of  democratic equality. This requires that we promote standing in 
relations of  equality with one another, notably those that promote equal 
respect, recognition, and power.14 
                                                 
14 I argue for these views in Global Justice, Chapter 12.  
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To illustrate how all of  this works in favour of  a concern for equality 
within societies, let us start with a specific form of  the worry about 
inequality: is it permissible to provide an adequate but unequal (and inferior) 
education to girls in a particular society, when boys within that society 
receive a much better education? If  a good is being provided to boys, there is 
much in my account that would support the view that it should be equally 
provided for girls.  Consider the idea that democratic equality requires 
standing in relations of  equality with one another.  Standing in relations of  
equality with others in the same society requires equal provision of  certain 
goods, such as voting and education. We also have a basic need for autonomy, 
which requires that we are vigilant for ways in which features of  our societal 
arrangements might promote domination. Insofar as boys’ superior education 
fosters such opportunities, further support can be marshaled against the idea 
of  endorsing adequate but inferior education for girls.  Support for equal 
provision can also be derived from the commitment to fair terms of  
cooperation in collective endeavours.  (Can we really find a thoroughly 
compelling rationale that unequal provision of  educational resources is 
consistent with fair terms of  co-operation?)  The fourth central criterion that 
seeks social and political arrangements that promote the preceding three 
important goods would require this as well (at least in virtue of  the need for 
autonomy and fair terms of  cooperation).  Unequal provision would not be 
consistent with a background social and political culture that appropriately 
expresses our equal moral worth, a commitment to promotion of  our equal 
basic liberties or equal promotion of  needs-fulfillment, fair terms of  co-
operation, and the like.   
Concerns with relational equality, non-domination and fair terms of  co-
operation that often yield a concern for more equality within states attract 
parallel attention in the global sphere.  Indeed, there is a significant need for 
improved global regulation as an effective and neglected way of  honoring our 
global justice commitments.  As we see then, fostering relational equality is 
the goal and distributional issues are important to that goal, but they do not 
and should not exhaust our concern with equality.  By looking at where 
unequal provision does undermine standing in relations of  equality with one 
another and where it does not, and, importantly, where other factors not 
related to individual holdings undermine standing in relations of  equality, we 
are able to come up with a more nuanced account of  when and how our 
equality matters.  The argument has to be made in domain- and good-specific 
terms.  For certain goods, equality is part of  adequacy.  Education and 
voting would seem to be paradigm cases.  But equal provision need not be 
important for all goods.  Equal provision of  housing may be one example.  
Moreover, in many cases, relevant concern with equality should guide us 
towards a focus on improved regulation rather than distribution per se, since 
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what blocks the possibility of  standing in relations of  equality is the exercise 
of  unequal power.  Improved regulation in the areas of  taxation and 
accounting, securing public goods, promoting press freedom, better 
protecting the architecture of  international justice and promoting a culture 
of  accountability are the sorts of  reforms which would have a more profound 
effect on promoting the kind of  equality to which we should aspire.15 
 
 
4. Some final thoughts: Feasibility and failures of  collective will 
 
Mandle correctly notes that I introduce several examples of  developments 
aimed at showing what is happening around the world to progress towards 
global justice.  He interprets my introduction of  examples as illustrations of  
what can be achieved for all.  For instance he remarks that while several 
countries have already enacted a carbon tax, something I observe, other 
countries have not, including the two countries responsible for more than 
40% of  the carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere annually, the United 
States and China.  This should threfore give us pause about how feasible some 
of  my policy recommendations really are.  I want to clarify next the point of  
introducing the examples of  current taxation practices and reforms, how 
they bear on the issue of  feasibility, and indeed clarify what I take the 
concept of  feasibility to be.  As Mandle rightly points out, it is not my job to 
predict success.  As he also notes, I am keen to show what we can do today in 
making some welcome changes: there are many steps that are feasible in 
making important progress towards a more globally just world. Failing to 
move in the indicated directions is something of  a collective failure of  will, 
rather than ideas. 
It is possible that judging feasibility may require different criteria in 
different domains.  Perhaps a generalisable account may not work for all 
domains: giving an account of  psychological feasibility may involve a 
different set of  useful criteria than giving an account of  (say) a feasible tax 
proposal.   At any rate, as an example, let us consider the issues of  feasibility 
in the area of  taxation arrangements in order to draw out some of  the 
criteria that will determine feasibility in public policy proposals. 
Throughout Chapter 5 of  Global Justice, I suggest various considerations 
are relevant to whether a tax should be considered feasible.  These include: (1) 
Support: (i) there is good public support for the tax, at least in good pockets 
well positioned to influence implementation decisions, or (ii) there is strong 
backing from influential figures well placed to make progress in advancing 
tax proposals; (2) Administrative ease: the tax can be collected easily, which 
can ensure administrative simplicity (and also good compliance); (3) 
                                                 
15 I argue for all of  this in much detail in Global Justice, especially Parts 2 and 3. 
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Precedent: how many other similar kinds of  tax proposals have already met 
with success, showing that similar taxes work reasonably well in other 
domains; and, relatedly, (4) Institutional assistance: that there are already 
existing, or partially existing, institutional mechanisms that could facilitate 
compliance or enforcement.  Of  these, (1) is probably the most important, 
since if  there is good support, institutional structure and administration of  
the tax can easily be created.  Using these kinds of  criteria one can show (for 
instance) that air-ticket taxes (taxes on the sale of  air tickets) or Tobin taxes 
(taxes on currency conversions) are feasible, since all of  (1)-(4) are relevantly 
present.  Note that even in the absence of  meeting (1)-(4), a tax policy might 
be considered feasible, because momentum is building towards generating the 
relevant support, or some such.  The criteria are not individually necessary 
but rather, when satisfied can be jointly sufficient to indicate feasibility.  
Though feasibility comes in degrees, the presence of  all of  (1)-(4) indicates 
that a sufficiency threshold has been reached to demonstrate that a 
particular policy can be considered feasibile. 
It is also important to note that my account differentiates sharply between 
“feasibility” and “likelihood of  success” (or anything else concerning 
predicting outcomes).  To say something is feasible is to make a very different 
claim from one about likelihood of  implementation success -- it is a judgment 
about whether something is capable of  being carried out, not whether it is 
reasonably likely that it will succeed.  “Capable of  being enacted” is used not 
in the sense of  “mere possibility”, but rather means to convey the idea that a 
proposal could be implemented, here and now, given a conjunction of  factors 
working in its favour. 
Finally, both Mandle and Thompson note that we demonstrate a failure of  
will rather than a lack of  vision when we fail to make significant progress 
towards global justice.  I think this is correct and important.  But it is 
important also to note that the responsibility to move towards instantiating 
more global justice in the world we inhabit is not evenly distributed.  Those 
who have more capacity to make changes, who have also benefited more from 
global injustices, and those who are more deeply implicated in perpetuating 
harm, or failing to reform institutions or practices of  a harmful nature, 
would seem to have greater responsibilities to generate the collective will 
required.  And so the questions posed about how to move forward in the face 
of  spectacular failure of  collective will should be especially pressing for those 
of  us who reside in affluent, developed countries. 
 
